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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we survey the way in which the tax burden on
labour has been proxied for in recent multi-country macro-economic studies. Second, we
critically evaluate these proxies. Finally, we examine to what extent the conclusions of some
studies change if some alternative indicator for the tax burden on labour is employed. We
conclude that the widely used tax ratios as developed by Mendoza et al. (1994) may not be
very reliable. The choice of the indicator for the tax burden on labour is also shown to affect
the conclusions of some well-known empirical models.
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1.  Introduction
Various recent studies have investigated the impact of the labour tax burden on unemployment,
using some kind of macro-econometric model. Generally, it is found that this impact depends on the
institutional features of the labour market.
1 For instance, Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998)
conclude that different collective bargaining arrangements influence the way in which the tax
wedge affects unemployment. The strongest impact is found for countries with intermediate levels
of centralisation/co-ordination in the labour market.
2 Likewise, Daveri and Tabellini (2000) argue
that the increase in unemployment and the slowdown in economic growth in continental and non-
Nordic Europe stem from higher labour taxes in combination with the institutional characteristics of
the labour market. An exogenous and lasting increase in labour costs reduces labour demand. Due
to a substitution of capital for labour, the marginal product of capital falls, according to these
authors, diminishing the incentive to invest and thus to grow.
Daveri and Tabellini (2000) have used the so-called tax ratios of Mendoza, Milesi-Ferretti
and Asea (1997) as approximations for effective tax rates. To calculate tax ratios, tax revenues are
expressed as a ratio of some aggregate tax base (e.g. labour income, capital income, consumption).
In other papers – like the study by Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998) – the tax burden on
labour is proxied by the tax wedge, i.e. the difference between gross labour costs to employers and
the consumption wage paid to employees (Scarpetta, 1996).
The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we will survey the way in which the tax burden
on labour has been proxied for in recent macro-economic studies that relate to a number of OECD
countries. So, we focus on studies at the macro-level and do not take micro-econometric evidence
into account.
3 We also do not deal with country specific studies.
4
Second, we will compare the various proxies used. We find that even though the various
proxies for the tax burden on labour differ substantially, their correlation is generally quite high. It
is quite amazing that many authors examining the relationship between the tax burden on labour
and unemployment hardly bother to identify the attributes of a tax burden measure that are
important in explaining the possible impact of labour taxes on unemployment. For instance, is a
marginal or an average tax rate needed, and should income-tested benefits be included or not?
Finally, we will examine to what extent the conclusions of some widely cited studies change
if some alternative indicator for the tax burden on labour is employed. To be more specific, we re-
estimate the unemployment models of Daveri and Tabellini (2000) and Nickell (1997) and the
investment model of Mendoza et al. (1997). In general, we conclude that the significance of the
impact of the tax burden on unemployment is not very sensitive with respect to the choice of the
indicator, which is in line with the reported high correlation of most indicators.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises studies that we are
aware of and discusses the tax wedge, while section 3 discusses labour tax ratios. The tax wedge
and the labour tax ratio are widely used in the empirical literature as proxies for the tax burden on
labour. Section 4 presents our empirical results and the final section offers some concluding
comments.
2. Tax burden on labour: tax wedge
Table 2 summarises recent macro-economic multi-country studies examining the effect of taxes on
labour.
5 Basically two (not mutually exclusive) approaches can be discerned. In one group of4
studies indicators for the tax-wedge are used, while in another group of studies tax ratios
(sometimes also called effective or implicit tax rates) are used as proxies for the tax burden on








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Taxes drive a wedge between the price of labour to employers and the return of labour for
the employees. Therefore, taxation influences decisions of employees about labour force
participation and labour supply. Similarly, taxation of labour affects the wage offered by employers.
Simple economic theory does not always provide a clear answer as to how agents will react to taxes
(OECD, 1995). For instance, an increase in tax rates on labour income may induce workers to work
more in order to compensate for the loss of consumption possibilities. Alternatively, they may
decide to work less as leisure has become more attractive due to the higher tax rate. Likewise,
higher taxes on labour will raise the cost of employing someone and will therefore reduce
employment to the extent that wages do not fall correspondingly. Under competitive markets,
wages will fall by the amount of the tax increase provided that labour is inelastically supplied.
However, labour (and product) markets may not be competitive. Unions and employers may take
tax changes into account when bargaining for wages. Trade unions may, for instance, try to shift the
higher burden of taxation to employers. So it depends on the bargaining structure at the labour
market and the bargaining power of the parties involved how taxes will affect the labour market.
7
Unfortunately, most of the papers summarized in table 2 do not provide some explicit
theoretical reasoning that leads to a clear identification of the tax burden measure one would want
to consider. Most studies summarized in table 2 examine the impact of the average effective tax rate
on an ‘average’ or ‘typical’ worker. Thereby, they are implicitly referring to the theory of imperfect
labour markets which implies that, in an imperfect labour market, a higher average tax rate on
labour income generates a tax push effect on real wages, which is likely to create additional
unemployment.
To illustrate this, we sketch the bargaining model of Scarpetta (1996) in which imperfectly
competitive profit-maximising firms face exogenously determined product market conditions and
predetermined capital and technology (Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991). Ignoring labour growth
and productivity effects, the model can be summarised by three equations, which describe (the
logarithm of) labour demand (Ld), the wage-setting schedule, and (the logarithm of) labour supply
(Ls).
u
n d w Z p w L − − − − =β α ) (,  ( 2 )
where w and p are the logarithms of gross wages (including taxes) and prices, respectively. Zn is a
vector of variables influencing labour demand and w
u is unanticipated wages, which account for
expectational errors. Real wages are assumed to be decreasing in actual unemployment (u) and
increasing in wage push factors (Zw), including features of the wage bargaining process and the
average tax rate:
u
w p u Z p w − − = − 1 1 γ δ , (2)
where p
u denotes unexpected price changes. Labour supply depends on factors affecting
participation decisions (Zp):
p s Z L 2 δ = . (3)
Taxes are also included in Zp. The marginal tax rate seems to be the relevant rate for addressing the
issue of whether or not to increase hours worked, while the average tax rate would seem to be the
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So, the equilibrium unemployment rate is determined by various factors, including the average tax
rate. Still, the analysis also suggests that the marginal tax rate may be relevant.
8 If the marginal and
average tax rates are highly correlated, regressions that only include the average tax rate may lead
to a biased estimate of the effect of the average tax rate. Scarpetta (1996) is the only study
summarised in table 2, which also takes marginal tax rates into account.
The analysis also suggests that if one is interested in the possible tax-push effect of the
average labour tax on unemployment, it is important that the tax rate used isolates taxes on labour
and does not include taxes on transfers. A tax that falls evenly on wages and benefits may not
generate a tax push effect on wage claims, since it does not increase the net replacement ratio. So in
evaluating the usefulness of alternative tax ratios for the purpose of estimating the effects on
unemployment it thus becomes important to consider the extent to which measures are
‘contaminated’ by taxes on transfers.
9
Even if it is clear from this simple model that some (properly defined) average tax rate can
be used in a macro-econometric model explaining unemployment, the model does not provide much
guidance on some other important attributes of the tax burden measure. For instance, should other
than labour income taxes be included in the tax wedge? In principle, just about every tax can have
an effect on the labour market. Still, most studies are confined to taxes on labour, although there are
differences as to how the tax wedge is measured. The most important difference is whether
consumption taxes should be included in the calculation of the tax wedge. Nickell (1997) argues
that total taxes, i.e. payroll, income and consumption taxes, are the tax burden on labour. The total
tax rate is a crude measure of the tax wedge between labour costs and take-home pay.
10 Switching
between these taxes will not have an important effect. Nickell (1997, p. 69) argues:
“Employees are interested in what their wages can buy. So if their income taxes are cut by
10 percent and the cost of consumption is raised by 10 percent, post-tax real wages are
unchanged and so is labour market behaviour. So, broadly speaking, what really counts is
the sum of payroll taxes, income taxes and consumption taxes; the total tax burden on
labour.”
One strategy to estimate the tax wedge is to combine the analysis of statutory tax schedules with
data on income distribution of the household and business sectors. McKee, Visser and Saunders
(1986) have calculated the (average and marginal) tax wedge on annual labour income data in 19
OECD countries using the ‘average production worker (APW)’ income level and information on
individual income tax and social security schedules. The basic approach is straightforward: a small
number of ‘typical’ families are chosen and the tax rules for each country are applied to them in
order to calculate average and marginal effective tax rates. Nowadays, the OECD publishes data for
eight types of tax payers in Taxing Wages (see Heady (2002) for further details). McKee et al.
define the tax wedge as the difference between gross labour costs to employers and the
consumption available to employees from increasing labour input by an additional unit. The tax rate
is the ratio of the tax wedge to gross labour costs. However, the tax burden for the ‘average
production worker’ may not be representative for the tax burden on all workers.
11 Furthermore,
estimates from statutory tax rates are complicated because each country has a range of exemptions
and allowances that change over time and are difficult to aggregate in each period and even more so
in a time-series setting (Fiorito and Padrini, 2001). So, various empirical studies in which the effects
of the tax wedge are examined employ other proxies for the tax wedge.
A good example is the study by Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998), who have estimated
various reduced-form models for unemployment. They define the tax wedge as the total value of
employers’ and employees’ social security contributions and personal income tax, divided by gross
earnings plus employers’ social security contributions. These authors conclude that different
collective bargaining arrangements influence the way in which the tax wedge affects
unemployment. The effect of the tax wedge on unemployment is absent in countries with a highly
centralised/co-ordinated wage bargaining system, and only marginally significant in countries with9
a decentralised system, while it is highly significant in countries with intermediate levels of
centralisation/co-ordination at the labour market.
These results contrast somewhat with those of Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), who find that
their tax variable is significant in their full sample of 20 OECD countries.
12 In sharp contrast, Palley
(2001) finds no effect of taxes on unemployment. These diverging conclusions are quite remarkable
because many of the studies summarised in table 2 consist of simple reduced-form models for
unemployment of the form (see also Daveri, 2001):
Ui,t = constanti + βTAXi,t + γXi,t + eit ,( 5 )
where i is the country index, t is the time index (often referring to period averages), U is the
unemployment rate, TAX is some proxy for the tax burden on labour and X is a vector of control
variables.
As pointed out before, instead of using some indicator for the tax wedge many studies have
employed so-called tax ratios to examine the relationship between labour taxes and unemployment.
Probably the best-known study in this line of research is by Daveri and Tabellini (2000). They have
used the tax ratios constructed by Mendoza, Milesi-Ferretti and Asea (1997) in a panel model like
equation (5) for 14 OECD countries over the period 1965-95. These authors conclude that high
labour taxes – in combination with the institutional set-up of the labour market – strongly contribute
to current high unemployment levels in Europe.
13 Their results suggest that, over a period of 30
years, the observed rise of about nine percentage points in the labour tax rate corresponds to a rise
in unemployment of about four percentage points. These findings are often used to support a
reduction in taxes on labour in Europe – preferably in a co-ordinated fashion – to stimulate
employment growth. In the following section, we will discuss the construction of tax ratios in more
detail.
3. Tax burden on labour: tax ratios
It follows from the previous section that quite a number of recent studies have used so-called tax
ratios (or effective tax rates), which are based on the methodology inspired by Lucas (1990) and
developed by Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) and the subsequent update thereof of Mendoza,
Milesi-Ferretti and Asea (1997). Tax ratios aim to give an easy to compute indication of the tax
burden on, for example, different sources of income or production factors. On the basis of limited
information – a few entries from the OECD’s National Accounts statistics and the Revenue
Statistics – it is possible to calculate indicators of the tax burden on, for example, labour.
14
The fundamental methodological problem in constructing labour income tax ratios is that
most tax categories as distinguished in the OECD Revenue Statistics relate to more than one
macroeconomic category (labour and capital income). Consequently, it is impossible to calculate
tax ratios without using some technique to artificially separate out the amounts to be allocated to
various macroeconomic categories. This is most evident for the personal income tax. The category
taxes on income, profits and capital gains on individuals in the OECD Revenue Statistics includes
taxes on labour, taxes on capital, personal taxes on income paid by the self-employed, and – at least
in some countries – taxes on transfers. Other revenue categories as distinguished in the OECD
Revenue Statistics are plagued by the same problem. Social security contributions (category 2000)
are, for example, paid by employees (labour) and – in various countries – also by recipients of
social security benefits and by the self-employed, whose income is partly earned by employing
capital.
Table 2 shows (employed) labour income tax ratios as calculated in the studies that we are
aware of. Our starting point, the study of Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994), distinguishes five tax
ratios. Two are relevant for this study, the personal income tax ratio (τper), and the labour income
tax ratio (τlab).
1510
Table 2. Labour Income Tax Ratios: An Overview
a
Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994)
τper 1100/(W+OSPUE+PEI)
τlab (τper ·W+ 2000 + 3000)/W+ 2200
Directorate General II of the European Commission (1997)
τper Same method as Mendoza et al. (1994)
τlab Same method as Mendoza et al. (1994)
OECD (2000)
τper 1100/(W – 2100 + OSPUE + PEI – 2300 – 2400)
τlab (τper · (W – 2100 +WSE) + 2100 + 2200 + 2300 + α · 2400 + 3000)/ (CoE
+WSE + 2300)
Where WSE = ES · ((W - 2100)/EE), and
 (W- 2100 +WSE/(OSPUE + PEI – 2300 +W- 2100) = α
Fiorito and Padrini (2001)
τper Same method as Mendoza et al. (1994)
τlab (τper · (W+ YSEL) + 2000)/(W+ 2100 + 2200 + YSEL)
Where YSEL = (W/EE) · ES
Volkerink and De Haan (2001)
b
τlab (λ · 1100 + 2100 + 2200 + 3000)/(CoE + 3000)
1000 Taxes on income, profits, and capital gains
1100 Taxes on income, profits, and capital gains on individuals
1110 On income and profits
1120 On capital gains
1200 Taxes on income, profits, and capital gains on corporations
2000 Social security contributions
2100 Social security contributions of employees
2200 Social security contributions of employers
2300 Social security contributions of self- and non-employed
2400 Social security contributions un-allocable between 2100, 2200, and 2300
3000 Taxes on payroll and workforce
OS Operating surplus of corporate and quasi-corporate enterprises
OSPUE Operating surplus of private unincorporated enterprises
W Wages and salaries
PEI Property and entrepreneurial income11
CoE Compensation of employees
c
EE Employment (number of dependent employees)
ES Number of self-employed
Notes:
a Eurostat (1997) and Martinez-Mongay (2000) are not shown here due to incompatibilities with the
methodologies displayed here.
b λ is explained in the text.
c In contrast to the item Wages and Salaries, the item Compensation of Employees consists of
wages and salaries, employers’ contributions to social security contributions, and employers’
contributions to private pension and social welfare plans.
Source: Adapted and updated from Volkerink and De Haan (2001).12
The personal income tax ratio developed by Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) is defined as
the ratio of revenues from taxes on income, profits, and capital gains of individuals (category 1100
in the OECD Revenue Statistics) to the tax base that consists of wages and salaries (W), the
operating surplus of unincorporated enterprises (OSPUE) and the property and entrepreneurial
income of households (PEI).
Directorate General II of the European Commission (1997), OECD (2000), Martinez-
Mongay (2000), and Fiorito and Padrini (2001) use the same detour as Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar
(1994) of first calculating a personal income tax ratio in order to calculate labour (and capital)
income tax ratios. The EC study, and Fiorito and Padrini (2001) use the same methodology as
Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994), whereas the OECD study includes category 2400 (social
security contributions not allocable to any specific group) in the numerator.
Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) define the labour income tax ratio as the product of the
personal income tax ratio (τper) and wages and salaries (W) plus total social security contributions
(2000) and taxes on payroll and workforce (3000) over the sum of wages and salaries (W) plus
employers’ social security contributions (2200). The calculation of the tax ratio on labour income
by Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) was copied by the Directorate General II of the European
Commission (1997).
The OECD (2000) study has also used this concept, albeit with different components. As
shown in table 2, the expression for τper is different; the factor is not multiplied by W, but by W
minus employee’s social security contributions (W-2100). It is thus assumed that the self-employed
‘pay’ themselves a salary that equals the average employment wage. This income is proxied by
multiplying labour income, excluding social security contributions (W-2100), by the share of the
self-employed (SE) to the number of dependent employees (EE). The numerator of the labour
income tax ratio furthermore includes both employees’ (2100) and employers’ (2200) social
security contributions as well as part of non-allocable social security contributions (α · 2400). The
tax base consists of total compensation of employees plus the ‘income’ of the self-employed plus
social security contributions by the self- and non-employed (CoE+WSE+2300). The ‘compensation
of employees’ equals the sum of wages and salaries, employer’s contributions to social security and
employers’ contributions for private pension and welfare plans.
Carey and Rabesona (2002) have presented a modified OECD (2000) methodology for
calculating the labour income tax ratio. The major changes with respect to the original methodology
are allowing for the deductibility of social security contributions, enlarging the tax base for the
labour income tax ratio by including payroll taxes, and a refinement in the separation of security
contributions bearing on labour or capital income. Moreover, the authors test for the sensitivity of
the estimates by relaxing several assumptions about, for example, the split of income taxes paid by
the self-employed. The modified estimates that result, are, however, highly correlated with the
original estimates.
Due to incompatibilities in terms of data, the methodology used by Martinez-Mongay
(2000) is not explicitly displayed in table 2.
16 All in all, his approach is, however, quite comparable
to the Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) methodology. The main differences with respect to the
personal income tax ratio are the inclusion of (part of) the net operating surplus in the denominator,
thus implicitly assuming that profits are fully distributed, and assigning more property income to
personal income, supplementary to PEI. The major differences compared to the methodology of
Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) are that, self-employed income is decomposed into two
components, attributed to labour and capital income, respectively, and the denominator includes the
compensation of employees, and not just wages and salaries.
Fiorito and Padrini (2001) use a similar method to separate the income from the self-
employed into a component that can be attributed to labour and capital, respectively. This is done
by multiplying the average wage sum (total wages over the number of employed, or W · EE) by the
number of the self-employed (SE). The labour income tax ratio is rather similar to the one derived
by Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994). However, not only the total wage sum, but also the ‘imputed13
wage of the self-employed’ (YSEL) are multiplied by the personal income tax ratio to estimate the
tax burden on labour income. Item 3000 (taxes on payroll and workforce) is not included in the
numerator. Obviously, the denominator also includes the imputed labour income of the self-
employed (YSEL).
Eurostat (1997) has also constructed a tax ratio on employed labour. The ratio is defined as
the fraction of taxes on employed labour and the compensation of employees – which includes
gross wages, wage taxes, and social security contributions of both employees and employers.
Eurostat uses its own data, however, so that the exact construction of the tax ratios differs
significantly from the Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) approach. National authorities in some
cases have indicated the percentage of taxes on income that can be attributed to labour or other
income.
What is wrong with labour tax ratios in general? Some studies use the personal income tax ratio as
an intermediate step in calculating labour and capital income tax ratios. This is problematic since
income from labour, capital income and transfers is included in the ‘tax base’ of personal income.
Furthermore, these studies assume that the same average tax rates apply to all these income
categories. This assumption is intuitively implausible, since some income components are largely
exempted from taxation, and furthermore, most OECD countries apply different statutory tax rates
to different sources of income. The OECD (2000) study goes somewhat in the right direction by
refining the personal income tax ratio to control for, for example, the (lower) income tax rates on
social security, as shown in Adema, Einerhand, Eklind, Lotz and Pearson (1996) and Adema
(1999). This still does not correct for the fundamental problem caused by different tax rates on
labour and capital income, however. Eurostat (1997) has opted for a more piecemeal approach. The
initial problem remains unsolved, however, since this approach still assumes that average tax rates
on both types of income are more or less the same.
Due to lack of data, the problem identified here is hard to overcome. Based on the OECD
Revenue Statistics, for only three countries, a (global) split in revenues from income taxes by
different sources of income can be made. However, sometimes further information can be used
(Directorate General XXI of the European Commission, 1998). In several cases, withholding taxes
on certain kinds of income (for example, wage taxes) can be identified which may serve to
approximate the parts of the income tax attributable to income from labour, capital, etc. Another
possibility is to split the income tax revenues on the basis of data provided by Member States
concerned. This is done in the Structures of the Taxation Systems in the EU for some countries.
Third, a rough split can be obtained by using National Accounts data on main aggregates (for
example, gross salaries divided by gross salaries plus the net operating surplus). However, if this
differentiated approach – denoted by λ in table 2 – is followed, a uniform method can no longer be
applied to all countries under review. This is the approach followed by Volkerink and De Haan
(2001).
As far as the income from self-employment is concerned, this income is typically earned by
combining labour and capital. As the Directorate General XXI of the European Commission (1998)
points out, the capital input can be almost zero (an opera singer) or very high (farmers) and it is
difficult, if not impossible, to split income taxes paid by the self-employed into a labour and capital
part. Therefore, it seems desirable not to subsume these taxes under labour or capital taxes but to
present them as a separate category.
A further difficulty with respect to the labour income tax ratio is the choice of the correct tax
base. Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994), the Directorate General II of the European Commission
(1997) and Fiorito and Padrini (2001) use the items wages and salaries and employers’ social
security contributions. Eurostat (1997) and Martinez-Mongay (2000) use the item compensation of
employees. This includes employers’ contributions for private pension and welfare plans. Since the
taxes are assigned to total labour costs of employers, the second approach seems preferable. A
significant part of the employer contributions may be voluntary, but they undoubtedly are part of
total labour costs. This is also in line with National Accounts conventions. Volkerink and De Haan14
(2001) redefined the denominator to include the compensation of employees and all taxes on payroll
and workforce. These are the total labour costs of employees to employers. Under this approach, the
following items have to be lumped together: gross wages, employers’ social security contributions
(2200), category 3000 and employers’ contributions for private pension and welfare plans. The
numerator should then include employers’ and employees’ social security contributions (2100 and
2200, excluding social security contributions paid by self- and non-employed), taxes on payroll and
workforce (3000), and all income taxes paid on labour income.
All variables discussed so far, aim to proxy for the tax burden on labour. To what extent do they
provide similar information? To answer this question, we will first analyse some simple correlation
coefficients. Table 3 shows the correlation of the following indicators for the tax burden on labour:
•  The indicator of Alesina and Perotti (1997) (AP)
•  The tax wedge of Elmeskov et al. (1998) (EMS)
•  The tax wedge of Nickell and Layard (1999) (NL)
•  The labour tax ratio of Mendoza et al. (1997) (MMA)
•  The labour tax ratio of Martinez-Mongay (2000) (M-M)
•  The labour tax ratio of OECD (2000) (OECD)
•  The labour tax ratio of Volkerink and De Haan (2001) (VdH).
17
Every correlation coefficient has been calculated for the maximum number of observations possible
(shown in parentheses). The Nickell-Layard indicator is only available for time-period averages,
whereas the other indicators are available on an annual basis. This explains why the correlations on
an annual basis (shown in the upper-right part of table 3) could not be calculated for the NL
indicator. The correlations between the various indicators using the period averages over 1983-88
and 1989-94 are shown in the lower-left part of table 3. To calculate these correlations, the annual
data for the other indicators were first transformed into period averages.
It is very remarkable that the correlations are generally quite high. With the exception of the
correlations between the indicators of Alesina and Perotti (1997), Nickell (1997) and the tax ratio of
Volkerink and De Haan (2001), all correlation coefficients are higher than 0.75.15
Table 3. Correlation between various indicators for the tax burden on labour































































































Note: the calculations in the upper-right part of the table are based on annual observations, while in
the lower-left part we have used period averages for 1983-88 and 1989-94. Figures in parentheses
show the number of observations.
To analyse this issue in somewhat more detail, figures 1 and 2 show some of the indicators for
Austria and Belgium. These countries have been selected on the basis of the availability of detailed
information on the distribution of the various components of the personal income tax. In other
words, for these countries we are pretty sure that the labour tax ratio as calculated in Volkerink and
De Haan (2001) is quite a reliable proxy for the tax burden on labour in comparison to the tax ratios
calculated on the basis of the methodology of Mendoza et al. (1994). It follows that the various
indicators follow a very similar trend, although the estimates of the level of the tax burden differ
substantially.16
Figure 1. Various indicators for the tax burden on labour for Austria.
































































































































































































































































































This section presents, for illustrative purposes only, the results of some well-known models in
which some indicator for the tax burden on labour has been used to examine to which extent the
choice of a certain proxy drives the outcomes. We start with unemployment using the model and
data of Daveri and Tabellini (2000).
18 So we take their model specification, sample of countries
included and time period covered. The model estimated is:
Ui,t = constanti + βTAXi,t + γ1UBi,t + γ2EPi,t + eit,( 6 )
where UB is unemployment benefit and EP is employment protection.
19 These authors argue that
labour taxes will have the strongest effect on unemployment if wage negotiations are decentralised
and trade unions are powerful but not too large. Therefore, they partition their sample in three
groups: continental Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK (1965-80) and Australia and New Zealand), the
Anglo-Saxon countries (Canada, Switzerland, UK (1981-96), USA and Japan) and the Nordic
countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden). They report that no correlation
between unemployment and labour taxes can be detected across countries. However, when they
differentiate between the three groups of countries in their panel over the period 1965-95 they find a
very significant effect of labour taxes in continental Europe.
The first column of table 4 reports our replication of model of Daveri and Tabellini (2000)
as reported in the first column of their table 9. The model includes country specific constants, which
is in line with the outcome of the likelihood ratio test (
2 χ = 131.02 with p = 0.00). Our results are
exactly the same as those of Daveri and Tabellini (2000). The coefficient of the labour tax ratio in
continental-Europe is significantly different from the coefficient of the labour tax ratio in the Nordic
and Anglo-Saxon countries. The same conclusion is reached if the model is estimated with
additional time-fixed effects (not shown).
If tax ratios like those of Mendoza et al. (1997) are used, like the data of Martinez-Mongay
(2000) and Volkerink and De Haan (2001) very similar results are found (see column 4 and 6 of
table 4, respectively).
20 This does not hold for the OECD labour tax ratio (column 5). This is
probably due the limited time period for which the OECD indicator is available (1981-95/96). It is
quite interesting that if alternative proxies for the tax burden on labour are used, again very similar
results are found.
21 This holds for the indicators of Alesina-Perotti (column 2) and Elmeskov et al.
(column 3). So it seems that the general conclusion is not very sensitive with respect to the choice
of the indicator for the tax burden on labour; this is in line with the reported high correlation
between most indicators.
As pointed out before, one objection to the use of tax ratios on labour in a model for
unemployment is that these tax ratios do not take indirect taxes into account. Columns (7) and (8) of
table 4 therefore present the outcomes if we adjust the labour tax ratios of Mendoza et al. (1997)
and Martinez-Mongay (2000) to include taxes on consumption. The basic conclusion does not
change: in the continental European countries taxes exert a negative influence on unemployment.18
Table 4. Some simple panel regressions using the Daveri-Tabellini model, 14 OECD countries,
5-year averages, 1965-95 (dependent variable: unemployment rate, U)
a
(1) (2) (3)
Tax proxy: MMA (DT) AP EMS
τ labEUR 0.54 (8.60) 0.75 (7.62) 0.30 (5.59)
τ labANGLO 0.25 (2.36) 0.44 (2.05) 0.22 (1.78)
τ labNORDIC 0.11 (0.71) 0.23 (1.60) -0.10 (-0.62)
UB 0.14 (2.82) 0.21 (5.45) 0.30 (4.61)
EP -1.00 (-1.76) -1.45 (-2.39) -0.76 (-1.24)
R
2 (adj.) 0.78 0.73 0.70
F-test that τ’s are
equal
6.96 (0.2%) 5.32 (0.7%) 3.79 (2.8%)
No. Obs. 84 84 82
b
(4) (5) (6)
Tax proxy: M-M OECD VDH
τ labEUR 0.58 (5.49) 0.02 (0.06) 0.55 (4.26)
τ labANGLO 0.19 (0.81) 0.00 (0.01) 0.82 (1.03)
τ labNORDIC 0.19 (0.93) 0.54 (1.64) -0.10 (-0.14)
UB 0.29 (3.00) 0.13 (0.98) -0.04 (-0.28)
EP -3.02 (-3.08) -4.07 (-1.67) 5.46 (1.80)
R
2 (adj.) 0.79 0.80 0.69
F-test that τ’s are
equal





Tax proxy: MMAadj (DT) M-Madj
τ labEUR 0.28 (5.92) 0.61 (4.71)
τ labANGLO 0.23 (1.83) 0.20 (0.75)19
τ labNORDIC -0.10 (-0.72) 0.14 (0.55)
UB 0.28 (4.00) 0.27 (2.39)
EP -0.30 (-0.50) -2.45 (-2.37)
R
2 (adj.) 0.71 0.78
F-test that τ’s are
equal
4.10 (2.1%) 3.13 (5.5%)
No. Obs. 81 55
Notes:
a Countries included are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States. The periods
considered are 1965/66-1970, 1971-1975, 1976-1980, 1981-1985, 1986-1990, and 1991-1995/96.
Estimation is with country dummies (no time dummies). T-statistics in parentheses.
b 82 observations due to missing observations for Norway for the periods 1965/66-1970 and 1971-
1975.
c No observations available for Australia, Canada, Norway, and the period 1965/66-1970.
d Only data available for 1980 onwards.
We have also estimated the unemployment model of Nickell (1997), which is very similar to the
model of Nickell and Layard (1999). This model is:
Ui,t = constant + βTAXi,t + γ1EPi,t + γ2RRi,t + γ3BDi,t + γ4ALMPi,t + γ5UDi,t + γ6UCIi,t + γ7COi,t +
γ8CPIi,t + γ9Dummy8994 + eit,( 7 )
where RR is the replacement rate, BD benefit duration, ALMP active labour market policies, UD
labour union density, UCI union coverage index, CO co-ordination, CPI change in inflation. Again
we have used the same set of countries (20 OECD countries) and time periods (1983-88 and 1989-
94) as in the original studies.
22 It follows that Nickell’s total tax ratio is significant (column 1 of
table 5). The same result shows up for AP, EMS, MMA, M-M and OECD (columns 2-6), albeit that
the MMA indicator is only significant at the 10 per cent level. This outcome is quite remarkable, as
– in contrast to the Nickell ratio – these proxies only take a limited number of taxes into account.
Only the coefficient the VDH indicator is not significantly different from zero. However, if we
adjust the labour tax ratios by including taxes paid on consumption, the coefficient of the tax ratio
of Volkerink-De Haan also becomes significantly different from zero (not shown).20
Table 5. Some simple panel regressions using the Nickell model, 20 OECD countries, 1983-88
and 1989-94, (dependent variable: log unemployment rate, U)
a
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax proxy: NL AP EMS MMA
TAX 0.03 (4.88) 0.05 (3.26) 0.03 (3.58) 0.02 (1.85)
EP 0.01 (0.74) 0.02 (1.58) 0.03(1.68) 0.02 (0.87)
RR 0.01 (2.63) 0.01 (2.63) 0.01(2.64) 0.01 (1.36)
BD 0.11 (2.59) 0.05 (1.29) 0.08 (1.81) 0.09 (1.70)
ALMP -0.03 (-4.51) -0.02 (-3.26) -0.02 (-3.62) -0.02 (-2.81)
UD 0.01 (3.36) 0.01 (1.38) 0.01 (2.04) 0.01 (2.40)
UCI 0.30 (1.85) 0.29 (2.01) 0.28 (1.51) 0.35 (1.68)
CO -0.45 (-7.34) -0.42 (-7.76) -0.45 (-6.52) -0.43 (-4.88)
CPI 0.04 (2.06) 0.03 (1.33) 0.05 (1.77) 0.05 (1.39)
Dummy8994 0.33 (3.16) 0.22 (2.32) 0.29 (2.57) 0.33 (2.40)
R
2 (adj.) 0.72 0.69 0.67 0.54




Tax proxy: M-M OECD VDH
TAX 0.04 (4.46) 0.03 (2.48) 0.00 (0.24)
EP 0.00 (0.08) 0.03 (1.66) 0.00 (0.08)
RR 0.01 (2.93) 0.01 (1.83) 0.01 (0.73)
BD 0.05 (1.08) 0.09 (1.80) -0.04 (-0.38)
ALMP -0.02 (-3.40) -0.02 (-3.20) 0.05 (2.14)
UD 0.00 (1.05) 0.01 (2.57) 0.00 (-1.01)
UCI 0.19 (1.10) 0.22 (1.06) 0.32 (1.06)
CO -0.47 (-7.21) -0.44 (-5.89) -0.38 (-4.99)
CPI 0.05 (2.33) 0.05 (1.69) 0.00 (0.02)
Dummy8994 0.13 (1.38) 0.31 (2.52) -0.01 (-0.03)
R





a Countries included are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. The periods considered are 1983-1988 and
1989-1994. Estimation is with time random effects.
b No observations available for Switzerland.
c No observations available for Ireland and Portugal.
d No observations available for Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland.
e No observations available for Australia, Canada, Denmark, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.
Next, we examine whether tax ratios are related to private investment, following Mendoza et al.
(1997). Mendoza et al. use an endogenous growth model to derive the theoretically expected signs
of the tax coefficients. In this model, investment and growth are jointly determined by taxes and
other exogenous variables. Output is produced with a Cobb-Douglas, CRS technology that uses
human capital H and physical capital K as inputs:
α α− =
1 ) ( ) ( t t t t t H u K v A Y (8)
where v(u) is the share of K(H) devoted to the production of goods. Mendoza et al. (1997) conclude
that taxes can affect growth and investment in various ways that may offset each other. This is the
case for the tax on capital, as a higher tax rate reduces the after-tax rate of return on physical
capital, thereby reducing growth. At the same time, a tax on capital reduces (vK/uH), thus
increasing the gross-of-tax return on capital, which positively affects growth. In contrast, a tax on
human capital raises (vK/uH), reduces the gross-of-tax return on capital, which has a negative
impact on growth. A tax on consumption will affect the labour-leisure decision, which in turn
affects the capital/labour ratio in production. In the model, the effect of a consumption tax on
growth is negative. Simulations of the model, using calibrated parameters, suggest that the effect of
reducing taxes on capital and labour and increasing consumption taxes hardly effects investment,
thereby supporting Harberger’s claim that the tax mix is not an important determinant of long-run
growth and investment rates. In line with these simulations, the empirical results of Mendoza et al.
(1997) suggest that the effect of capital and labour taxes on investment is strongly negative,
whereas the effect of consumption tax is strongly positive. They also find that tax rates are
generally not statistically significant for explaining growth.
We start with replicating the private investment model of Mendoza et al. (1997) using a time
fixed effects model for five-year averages of investment (I). The only explanatory variables
considered are the convergence factor (log of GDP per capita in 1965, Y0) and the tax ratios on
labour, capital and consumption (τlab, τcap and τcon, respectively). The estimated panel model is:
Ii,t = α Y0i + β1 τ lab i,t + β2 τ cap i,t + β3 τ con i,t + timet,( 9 )
where t denotes a five-year period index and i is the country index (data are the same as in
Volkerink et al., 2002). Following Mendoza et al. (1997), time dummies (timet) are also included
although the likelihood ratio test indicates that it is not necessary to include them (
2 χ
 = 4.32 with p-
value = 0.36), while country dummies are not included.22
The results as shown in column (1) of table 6 are very similar to those of Mendoza et al.
(1997): the consumption tax ratio has a significant positive coefficient, while the impact of the other
tax ratios is significantly negative.
23 The same results show up for the M-M indicator (column 2),
whereas the results with the OECD tax ratios differ, which is probably due to the limited period for
which these data are available (column 3).
Table 6. Some simple panel regressions for private investment (dependent variable: gross
investment as share of GDP)
(1) (2) (3)










Y0 1.70 (1.17) -0.43 (-0.37) 0.15 (0.10)
τ lab -0.16 (-4.04) -0.24 (-3.51) -0.09 (-1.29)
τ cap -0.28 (-4.16) -0.15 (-1.90) 0.04 (1.46)
τ con 0.17 (2.61) 0.19 (2.04) 0.02 (0.28)
R
2 (adj.) 0.33 0.37 0.12















Y0 2.66 (17.04) 2.85 (19.08) 2.70 (10.84)
τ lab -0.19 (-2.80) -0.51 (-11.83) -0.57 (-5.35)
τ cap -0.05 (-0.98) -0.05 (-0.63) 0.02 (0.86)
τ con -0.03 (-0.28) 0.22 (1.82) 0.67 (3.96)
R
2 (adj.) 0.84 0.84 0.71















Y0 2.99 (15.44) 2.79 (7.17) 2.11 (3.90)
τ labEUR -0.37 (-4.13) -0.49 (-79) -0.51 (-3.32)
τ labANGLO -0.19 (-2.70) -0.47 (-2.89) -0.32 (-1.32)
τ labNORDIC 0.25 (2.18) -0.56 (-7.38) -0.77 (-4.67)
τ cap -0.08 (-1.73) -0.06 (-0.77) 0.02 (0.81)
τ con -0.36 (-2.78) 0.24 (1.97) 0.66 (3.87)
R




21.69 (0.0%) 0.61 (73.8%) 3.03 (22.0%)
No. Obs. 60 80 54
Notes:
a Countries included are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, the
United States. The periods considered are 1965/66-1970, 1971-1975, 1976-1980, 1981-1985, and
1986-1990.
b Countries included are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, the United States. The
periods considered are 1971-1975, 1976-1980, 1981-1985, 1986-1990, and 1991-1995/96.
c Countries included are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. The periods considered are 1981-1985, 1986-
1990, and 1991-1995/96.
So far, we have followed Mendoza et al. (1997) and only used time dummies. However, as shown
by Islam (1995), neglecting unobserved differences between countries induces an omitted variables
problem. The hypothesis that country dummies can be ignored is strongly rejected. The next three
columns of table 6 therefore show the results if we employ a model with country dummies. It
follows that the results change drastically: the capital tax ratio is no longer significant, no matter
which indicator is used. The labour tax ratio becomes always significant. These results differ
substantially from those reported by Mendoza et al. (1997). However, we like to stress that this is
not so much caused by the choice of the tax ratios but by the specification of the model.
Finally, we have explicitly tested the argument of Daveri and Tabellini (2000) that high
labour taxes in combination with the institutional set-up of the labour market have affected
investment. According to these authors, an exogenous and lasting increase in labour costs reduces
labour demand. Due to a substitution of capital for labour, the marginal product of capital falls,
diminishing the incentive to invest. Daveri and Tabellini presume that this effect will be strongest if
wage negotiations are decentralised and trade unions are powerful but not too large. So, the labour24
tax ratio is negatively related to investment, depending on the institutional characteristics of the
labour market. In other words, the labour tax ratio should be different among the three groups of
countries as distinguished by Daveri and Tabellini (2000). Rows (7)-(9) in table 6 present the
outcomes. The results are mixed. Only if we use the Mendoza tax ratio as provided by Daveri and
Tabellini, we can reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of all labour tax ratios are the same.
These results therefore do not yield much support for the Daveri-Tabellini point of view concerning
the impact of labour taxes on investment.
5. Concluding Comments
In this paper we have first surveyed the way in which the tax burden on labour has been proxied for
in recent multi-country macro-economic studies. Most of these studies estimate unemployment
models, in which the tax burden on labour is one of the explanatory variables. Basically two (not
mutually exclusive) approaches can be discerned. In one group of studies indicators for the tax-
wedge are used, in another group of studies tax ratios are used as proxies for the tax burden on
labour. We find that even though the various proxies for the tax burden on labour differ
substantially, their correlation is generally quite high.
The most important difference between various proxies for the tax wedge used is whether or
not consumption taxes are included in the calculation of the tax wedge. By definition, consumption
taxes are not included in the calculation of labour tax ratios. One may therefore wonder whether
labour tax ratios are the proper variables to be used in estimating macro-economic, multi-country
models for unemployment. The fundamental methodological problem in constructing labour income
tax ratios is that most tax categories as distinguished in the OECD Revenue Statistics relate to more
than one macroeconomic category (labour and capital income). Consequently, it is impossible to
calculate tax ratios without using some technique to artificially separate out the amounts to be
allocated to various macroeconomic categories. We argue that the way this is done by Mendoza et
al. (1994) and in more recent studies is rather unreliable.
Finally, we have examined to what extent the conclusions of some studies change if some
alternative indicator for the tax burden on labour is employed. We conclude that the significance of
the impact of the tax burden on unemployment is not very sensitive with respect to the choice of the
indicator. This is in line with the reported high correlation between the various indicators.
Essentially the same conclusion holds for our replications of the Nickell-model: in almost all
variants the coefficient of the tax variable is significant. Another finding is that – in contrast to the
reasoning of Daveri and Tabellini (2000) – the significance of the labour tax ratio in the simple
investment model of Mendoza et al. (1997) does not depend on the institutional characteristics of
the labour market.25
References
Adema, W. (1999), “Net Public Social Expenditure”, OECD Labour Market and Social Policy
Occasional Papers, Nr. 39.
Adema, W., M. Einerhand, B. Eklind, J. Lotz, and M. Pearson (1996), “Net Public Social
Expenditure”, OECD Labour Market and Social Policy Occasional Papers, Nr. 19.
Alesina, A. and R. Perotti (1997), “The Welfare State and Competitiveness”, American Economic
Review, 87 (5), 921-939.
Bean, C.R, R. Layard, and S. Nickell (1986), “The Rise in Unemployment: A Multi-Country
Study”, Economica, 53, 1-22.
Belot., M., and J.C. van Ours (2001), “Unemployment and Labor Market Institutions; An Empirical
Analysis”, OSA working paper, Nr. 2001-10.
Blanchard, O. and J. Wolfers (2000), “The role of shocks and institutions in the rise of European
unemployment: The aggregate evidence”, The Economic Journal, 110, C1-C33.
Carey, D. and J. Rabesona (2002), “Average Effective Tax Rates on Capital, Labour and
Consumption”, Paper presented at CESifo Venice Summer Institute, 2002.
Daveri, F. (2001), “Labor taxes and unemployment: A survey of the aggregate evidence”, Mimeo.
Daveri, F. and G. Tabellini (2000), “Unemployment, growth and taxation in industrial countries”,
Economic Policy, 30, 49-104.
Directorate General II of the European Commission (1997), “Effective Taxation and Tax
Convergence in the EU and the OECD”, unpublished memo 5/1997.
Directorate General XXI of the European Commission (1998), “How to measure the burden of
taxation: Implicit tax rates according to the (primary) functional incidence approach”, Mimeo.
Elmeskov, J., J.P. Martin and S. Scarpetta (1998), “Key lessons for Labour Market Reforms:
Evidence from OECD Countries’ Experiences”, Swedish Economic Policy Review, 5(2), 205-252.
Eurostat (1997), Structures of the Taxation Systems in the European Union, 1970-1995. Series 2A,
Luxembourg.
Fiorito, R. and F. Padrini (2001), “Distortionary taxation and labour market performance”, Oxford
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 63(2), 173–196.
Hamermesh, D.S. (1993), Labour Demand, Princeton University Press, Princeton N.J..
Heady, C. (2002), “The ‘Taxing Wages’ Approach to Measuring the Tax Burden on Labour”, Paper
presented at CESifo Venice Summer Institute, 2002.
Islam, N. (1995), “ Growth Empirics: A Panel Data Approach” ,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 1127–1170.
Knoester, A. and P. van der Windt (1987), “Real wages and taxation in 10 OECD Countries”,
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 49, 151-169.
Koskela, E. (2001), “Labour taxation and employment in trade union models: A partial survey”,
Bank of Finland Discussion papers, Nr. 12001.
Layard, R., S. Nickell, and R. Jackman (1991), Unemployment: Macroeconomic Performance and
the Labor Market, Oxford University Press, New York, NY.
Lucas, R.E. (1990), “Supply-side economics: An analytical review”, Oxford Economic Papers, 42,
293-316.
Martinez-Mongay, C. (2000), “ECFIN’s Effective Tax Rates: Properties and Comparisons with
other Tax Indicators”, European Commission Economic Papers, Nr. 146.
McKee, M.J., J.J.C. Visser and P.G. Saunders (1986), “Marginal Tax Rates on the Use of Labour
and Capital in OECD Countries”, OECD Economic Studies, 7, 45-101.
Mendoza, E.G., G.M. Milesi-Ferretti and P. Asea (1997), “On the ineffectiveness of tax policy in
altering long-run growth: Harberger’s superneutrality conjecture”, Journal of Public Economics,
66(1), 99–126.
Mendoza, E.G., A. Razin and L.L. Tesar (1994), “Effective tax rates in macroeconomics. Cross-
country estimates of tax rates on factor incomes and consumption”, Journal of Monetary
Economics, 34(3), 297–323.26
Nickell, S.J. (1997), “Unemployment and labour market rigidities: Europe versus North America,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11, 55-74.
Nickell, S.J. and R. Layard (1999), “Labor Market Institutions and Economic Performance”, in: O.
Ashelfelter and D. Card (eds), Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 3C, North Holland, Amsterdam.
Nickell, S.J., L. Nunziata, W. Ochel and G. Quintini (2001), “The Beveridge Curve, Unemployment
and Wages in the OECD from the 1960s to the 1990s”, Centre for Economic Performance
Discussion Paper, Nr. 502.
Nunziata, L. (2001), “Institutions and Wage Determination: A Multi-Country Approach”, Nuffield
College, mimeo.
OECD (1995), Taxation, Employment and Unemployment, Paris: OECD.
OECD (2000), “Effective Average Tax Rates On Capital, Labour, and Consumption Goods: Cross-
country Estimates”, Economics Department, Working Paper, Nr. 258.
Palley, T.I. (2001), “The Role of Institutions and Policies in Creating High European
Unemployment: The Evidence”, mimeo.
Scarpetta, S. (1996), “Assessing the role of labour market policies and institutional settings on
unemployment: A cross-country study”, OECD Economic Studies, 26, 43-98.
Volkerink, B. and J. de Haan (2001), “Tax Ratios: A Critical Survey,” OECD Tax Policy Studies,
No. 5.
Volkerink, B., J-E. Sturm and J. de Haan (2002), “Tax ratios in macro-economics: Do taxes really
matter?”, Empirica, 29, 209-224.27
Appendix. Data sources.
Sources for table 3:






















Sources for table 4:





















Sources for table 5:
All data for the Nickell model taken from Palley (2001). The other indicators for the tax burden on
labour are as in table 3.
                                                
Notes
1 Still, the OECD (1995, p. 93) stresses that while tax rates are important for the labour supply and
demand decisions of households and firms, there “is no evident simple link between the tax burden
and the level of unemployment, which suggests that taxation may not be the principal determinant
of unemployment”. However, this conclusion may reflect that labour market characteristics are not
properly taken into account. Indeed, Daveri and Tabellini (2000) report that no correlation between
unemployment and labour taxes can be detected across countries. However, when they differentiate
between the three groups of countries depending on differences in labour market institutions, they
find a very significant effect of labour taxes in continental Europe.
2 Similarly, Alesina and Perotti (1997) report that the degree of shifting of labour taxation is a
hump-shaped function of the degree of centralisation of labour markets, peaking in countries with
an intermediate degree of centralisation.
3 Some may doubt whether analyses at the macro-level make sense at all, as a single rate averaged
across tax payers may be problematic since it neglects e.g. the distribution of labour income. Still,
as will be explained in more detail in section 2, a substantial literature has recently addressed the
impact of labour taxes on unemployment from a multi-country, macro-economic perspective.
4 Country specific studies come to a variety of conclusions. For a summary, see OECD (1995).
5 Earlier studies provide evidence on the impact of taxes in reduced-form wage equations (see e.g.
Knoester and van der Windt, 1987). Hamermesh (1993, table 5.1) summarises studies estimating
Phillip-curve-type equations with a (payroll) tax term appended. According to Daveri (2001), there
was no consensus in this earlier literature either about the size of the tax shift or about the likely
causes of the estimated differences.
6 Mendoza et al. (1994, p. 302) write that their method “by suggesting the use of data on pre- and
post-tax income and prices, produces aggregate effective tax rates that in fact correspond to realized
average tax rates. These tax rates aggregate the information on statutory taxes, credits, deductions,
and exemptions implicit in national accounts and revenue statistics in a manner that captures the
overall tax burden from each tax and maintains consistency with the representative agent
framework.” Section 3 discusses the approach of Mendoza et al. (1994) in more detail.28
                                                                                                                                                                 
7 There are alternative approaches to model unemployment and its relationship to taxes, like
efficiency wage models, search and matching models and bargaining models. See e.g. Koskela
(2001) for further details.
8 We owe this point to Steven Clark.
9 We owe this point to the Peter Birch Sørensen.
10 Bean et al. (1986) give some more details about the calculation of this total tax ratio. It consists of
the sum of 1. Ratio of employers’ contributions to social security and pensions to the wage bill; 2.
Household contributions to social security and direct taxes as proportion of income; and 3. Indirect
taxes (net of subsidies) as a proportion of consumers’ expenditure.
11 The APW income level is the average of earning of production workers in the manufacturing
sector. Thus, despite its name, the APW does not represent the income level of an average
production worker nor is it otherwise a meaningful average for workers or households (McKee et
al., 1986).
12 Apart from the use of different indicators for the tax burden on labour, the studies of Elmeskov et
al. (1998) and Blanchard and Wolfers also differ somewhat in terms of country and period coverage
and with respect to the other variables taken up in the model. The main difference between both
studies, however, is that in contrast with Blanchard and Wolfers, Elmeskov et al. interact their tax
variable with proxies for the level of centralization of the labour market.
13 A serious concern with the study of Daveri and Tabellini is the way labour market institutions are
taken into account by simply dividing the countries in three groups. On the basis of which criteria
this is done remains rather unclear from the paper. According to Nunziata (2001), the composition
of each country group suffers from a certain degree of subjectivity. To what extent the grouping of a
certain country affects the results is not examined. There are various aspects of the labour market
that may influence unemployment and labour costs and not necessarily in the same direction. In his
model for labour costs, Nunziata (2001) divides his countries also in three groups depending on
either the degree of bargaining co-ordination or the degree of bargaining centralisation. In the first
case, the tax variable has a positive impact on all groups of countries and not only on the
intermediate group. In the second case, the impact of the tax variable is not significant in centralised
countries only, while in decentralised and intermediate countries wage costs are significantly
affected by employment taxation.
14 Tax ratios are average tax rates rather than marginal tax rates, which – in general – might seem
more relevant to evaluate the impact of taxation. However, Fiorito and Padrini (2001) argue that
this point should not be overstated for two reasons. First, average and marginal tax rates are
considerably correlated as shown by Nickell and Layard (1999). Second, marginal tax rates are
plagued by larger measurement errors than tax ratios. We doubt, however, whether this second
argument is correct (see below). Finally, for some issues (including the effect of taxes on
unemployment) average tax rates should be used.
15 The personal income tax ratio is sometimes used as an intermediary step in calculating the labour
income tax ratio, and should therefore be considered as well.
16 Martinez-Mongay (2000) uses the so-called AMECO (Annual Macroeconomic) database. This
database is less detailed than the Revenue Statistics and the detailed tables from the National
Accounts statistics from the OECD. It is also not available to the public. The main advantage
compared to the use of OECD data is that these are available more rapidly, and are available for a
longer time period.
17 In calculating these correlations we have used – as far as possible – the data as published in the
original studies. Only for AP and EMS data of the OECD have been used, given the general29
                                                                                                                                                                 
definitions of the various tax burdens provided by the authors. See the Appendix for our data
sources.
18 We thank the authors for kindly providing their data.
19 One may criticise this specification as many potential control variables are not included.
However, as our aim is to examine how sensitive the results are for the choice of a certain indicator
for the tax burden on labour, we have used the same model as Daveri and Tabellini (2000).
20 However, the F-test that the coefficients of the various tax indicators are the same cannot be
rejected (at the 5% significance level) for the M-M and VdH indicators.
21 The Nickell indicator is not used here due to data availability.
22 The data have been taken from Palley (2001).
23 See column 1 of table 4 of Mendoza et al. (1997).CESifo Working Paper Series
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